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This paper provides an overview of the Chinese banking sector, which has expanded tre-
mendously over the past two decades. We first describe aggregate developments of the sec-
tor and compare them to the situation in other countries. Also, various financial institutions 
that operate in China are analyzed. Our results confirm that the Chinese banking sector is 
truly in a class of its own, especially given the level of China’s economic development. 
Despite significant reforms, the state and various public organizations still own controlling 
shares in the largest commercial banks. The state is also present on the borrowers’ side; it 
is estimated that about half of state-owned commercial bank lending still goes to state-
controlled companies. In this way, the banking system can serve as an important policy 
tool. Another distinctive feature of the Chinese banking sector is the variety of its banking 
institutions. New types of banking institutions, especially those serving rural areas, are 
emerging all the time. While equity and debt markets are still tiny relative to the banking 
sector and their importance as sources of financing of investment remain minor, they have 
evolved rapidly in recent years. 
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Like China, the Chinese banking sector  






Tässä tutkimuksessa esitetään yleiskatsaus Kiinan nopeasti kasvaneeseen pankkisektoriin. 
Ensin kuvaillaan sektorin kehitystä ja verrataan sitä muiden maiden tilanteeseen. Työssä 
myös analysoidaan muiden kiinalaisten rahoituslaitosten toimintaa. Kiinan pankkijärjes-
telmä on monin tavoin ainutlaatuinen, varsinkin kun Kiinan taloudellinen kehitystaso ote-
taan huomioon. Pankkijärjestelmän uudistuksista huolimatta julkinen sektori hallitsee edel-
leen suurimpia pankkeja. Julkisen sektorin omistamien pankkien lainanannosta puolestaan 
noin puolet menee valtionyrityksille. Tällä tavoin julkinen sektori voi käyttää pankkijärjes-
telmää talouspolitiikan välineenä. Kiinan pankkijärjestelmän ominaispiirteitä on myös eri-
laisten pankki-instituutioiden suuri määrä. Uudenlaisia pankkeja syntyy jatkuvasti, etenkin 
maaseudulla. Kiinan osake- ja velkakirjamarkkinat ovat kehittyneet nopeasti viime vuosi-
na, mutta ovat vielä erittäin pienet pankkijärjestelmään verrattuna, ja niiden merkitys yri-
tysten rahoituksessa on vähäinen. 
 
Asiasanat: Kiina, pankkijärjestelmä, valtionpankit 
JEL: G28, P34, G21 BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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1  Introduction  
 
This paper provides a brief overview of the Chinese banking sector, which has expanded 
tremendously over the past two decades. Given the importance of China as the world’s 
second largest economy and the prominent role of its banking sector, analyzing the current 
state and future of the banking sector is of great interest. 
Growth in the banking sector has been accompanied with a substantial improve-
ment in the quality and diversity of financial services available. In this respect, the Chinese 
experience reflects that of former socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), 
where market-oriented banks and financial systems have swiftly achieved high degrees of 
sophistication. In stark contrast with most CEE countries, where large-scale foreign in-
vestment  and  participation  in  the  banking  sector  has  been  the  norm,  China’s  state-
controlled banks continue to dominate the financial sector. Here, Chinese policy has strik-
ing parallels to the Russian experience; there has never been a major effort to privatize 
banking and banks today continue to be directly or indirectly controlled by the state or 
public institutions.
1 
In the following, we note and analyze aggregate developments of the Chinese 
banking sector. As the Chinese banking system as percentage of GDP is substantially lar-
ger than in other middle-income countries, we also compare the Chinese banking system to 
those found in more advanced countries. One reason Chinese banking differs from most 
countries is the high savings rate, which, in turn, has become an integral aspect of the Chi-
nese growth model.  
Another  distinctive  feature  of  the  Chinese  banking  sector  is  the  variety  of  its 
banking institutions. New types of banking institutions, especially those serving rural ar-
eas, are emerging all the time. Many of the implemented reforms have also significantly 
contributed to improving the financial health of banks.  
In addition to the banking sector, we briefly discuss other parts of the financial 
sector. While equity and debt markets are still tiny relative to the banking sector and their 
importance as sources of financing of investment remain minor, they have evolved rapidly 
in recent years. 
                                                 
1 The lack of capital controls, of course, means that Russians have greater freedom in choosing providers of 
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Given the massive size of the Chinese banking sector, significant further growth 
(as share of GDP) seems unlikely. The government’s stimulus efforts to avoid recession in 
2009 resulted in a massive spike in bank lending that increased the consolidated banking 
sector balance sheet by approximately a third. Rather than pull back, bank lending went on 
to expand an additional 20 % in 2010. Lending outside the banking sector’s balance sheet 
has also grown strongly (García-Herrero and Santabarbara, 2011). These lending trends in 
themselves should be sufficient to raise concerns about the quality of bank loan portfolios 
and the need to curtail growth of bank lending in coming years, but there is additionally the 
Chinese central administration’s own declared intention to move away from “excessive” 
reliance on investment as the engine of growth. An increased share of GDP going to con-
sumption reduces demand for bank loans and drains the household savings currently held 
as bank deposits. This is in line with the government’s objective of allowing the relative 
importance of banks to decrease in coming years while promoting the profile of securities 
markets. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we analyze the 
Chinese banking sector in a macroeconomic context, assess its role in  China’s growth 
strategy, and compare it to other countries. In the third section, we describe the structure of 
the banking sector. Section four analyzes the structure of the bank balance sheets and bank 
performance, as well as other parts of the financial sector such as equity and bond markets. 
The final section provides concluding remarks. 
 
 
2  Over-banked China 
 
Even though China can be characterized as a transition economy, its banking system has 
developed very differently from other transition countries. In most CEE transition econo-
mies, foreign-owned banks were allowed to enter the country from the beginning of the 
transition process and eventually dominate the banking sector. In Russia and several other 
countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), state-owned banks continue 
to be important players in the sector, but even here, the role of foreign banks has been 
more pronounced than in China − even in retail banking.  
Perhaps the crucial feature that differentiates China from other countries of similar 
income level, however, is the sheer size of its banking sector relative to the size of the BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 32/ 2011 
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economy. Figure 1 plots domestic credit to private sector (as percentage of GDP) and per 
capita GDP. It is obvious that there is positive correlation between the level of income and 
the size of the banking sector. More interestingly, domestic credit (very much associated 
with lending from domestic banks) is clearly much higher than suggested by China’s in-
come level. Thus, a byproduct of the Chinese growth model, which relies heavily on sav-
ings and investment, has been the creation of a behemoth banking sector with little room 
left to further increase its relative size without incurring significant problems such as ero-
sion of loan quality. 
Figure 1  Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) and per capita GDP  
  (purchasing power parity at 2005 dollars) for 2008 and 2009, as well as quadratic trend. 
 
 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators 
 
The banking sector continues to be the main outside source for financing investment, and 
bank deposits remain the preferred form of saving for most Chinese companies and house-
holds. However, it should be noted that company resources (including retained earnings) 
constitute the most important source of funds for investment in fixed assets in Chinese 
companies. Figure 2 shows the evolution in the shares of different investment financing 
sources between 2004 and 2011. The share of self-raised financing clearly increases over 
time. At the end of the third quarter 2011, this source of financing accounts for over 65% 
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rowing, e.g. borrowing from family and friends are common in China
2. We also see that 
the relative importance of banks has decreased over time relative to the importance of own 
financing.  
Bank financing of investment was RMB 1,278 billion in 2004 and RMB 3,364 
billion ($529 billion) at the end of the third quarter 2011. Still, even with a tripling in the 
period, the relative importance (share of total financing) of the banking sector in invest-
ment financing decreased from 20% in 2004 to 14% at the end of September 2011. The 
proportions of the other sources of funds are relatively minor. 
 
Figure 2  Sources of funds for investments in fixed assets, share of different sources  
 
 
Source: CEIC (calculated based on monthly data) 
 
 
Bank loans are the most important source of external funding for the non-financial sector 
in China. They accounted for 75% of all external funding sources at the end of 2010, and 
exceeded 80% during the crisis years of 2008 and 2009 when other external sources were 
difficult to obtain. As we saw in early 2009, the Chinese authorities can turn to bank lend-
ing as a policy tool when the need arises. Bonds have become an increasingly important 
source of financing; their share in external funding has climbed significantly since 2005 
(see Table A.7). In general, Chinese bond markets have developed briskly in recent years 
                                                 
2 IMF (2011) notes the prevalence of “shadow banking,” which consists of both completely unregistered 
lending activity and more formal institutions such as private equity funds and various wealth management BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 32/ 2011 
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along with the expressed desire of the authorities to increase international use of the ren-
minbi. Even so, compared to the size of the Chinese banking sector, the local bond market 
is still in its infancy.  
Equity  markets  were  initially  established  in  1990  in  Shanghai  and  Shenzhen 
(many  Chinese  companies  are  also  listed  in  Hong  Kong).  China’s  stock  markets  have 
grown in size and importance, and are now comparable in size to other middle-income 
countries. Bloomberg data (see Figure 3) show the ratio of stock market capitalization to 
GDP in China was 30% in 2002 and 67% in 2010. In countries such as Russia, Poland, and 
Germany, the corresponding number was around 40% in 2010. A caveat here is that out-
standing shares are not necessarily freely tradable in China’s case, i.e. public entities con-
tinue to hold majority stakes in listed firms, especially large ones (including banks).  
Therefore, Chinese banks have been an important part of a Chinese growth model 
based on savings and investment. While companies continue to finance the bulk of their 
investments out of pocket, bank loans remain by far the most important outside source of 
financing.  
 





                                                                                                                                                    
products. For example, total value of different wealth management products at the end of 2010 was RMB 
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3  Structure of the banking sector 
 
3.1  Institutional development of the Chinese banking sector 
 
The  roots  of  the  current  Chinese  banking  sector  can  be  traced  to  economic  reforms 
launched in the 1970s (Okazaki, 2007). In contrast to the CEE socialist economies, where 
the first tentative steps in banking liberalizing did not start until mid-1980s, the Chinese 
authorities carved out four huge banks from the state monobank already in 1979 and 1984 
(Feyzioğlu, 2009). The ultimate aim was to support market reforms with the help of a func-
tioning financial system. Chinese market reforms, however, progressed quite slowly and 
were mirrored in development of the banking sector.
3 Nevertheless, four large specialized 
banks had been established by 1984: 
1.  The Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) 
2.  The Bank of China (BoC) 
3.  The People’s Construction Bank of China, from 1996 onwards 
   the China Construction Bank (CCB) 
4.  The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) 
 
The names of three of these giant banks broadly described their designated field of opera-
tions. The BoC was established to finance foreign trade. All four banks are today exchange 
listed, yet remain majority-owned by the state.  
Allen et al. (2008) report that most of the development of the Chinese financial 
system in the 1980s actually occurred away from the four big state-owned banks; the ac-
tion, it seems, was in establishment of  banks and other financial institutions in provinces 
and cities. Local governments helped set up small regional banks in Special Economic 
Zones, as well as Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCC) in the countryside and Urban Credit 
Cooperatives (UCC) in cities.  
During the 1990s, the banking sector went through a cycle of lending boom and 
bust associated with a rapid increase in fixed capital investment. The lending boom re-
sulted in a proliferation of non-performing loans (NPLs) as it was common at this time to 
conduct bank business without particular concern for profit-maximizing and allow local 
authorities to use banks to finance their own pet projects. 
                                                 
3 Notably, fledgling market reforms in the Soviet Union also led to establishment of five sectoral banks; Vne-
shekonbank for foreign trade, Promstroibank for industry and building, Agroprombank for agriculture, Zhil-
sotsbank for communal services and Sberbank for savings (see e.g. Lane, 2002). BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 32/ 2011 
 
 
  13 
China’s membership in the WTO in December 2001 ushered in a new era for Chi-
nese banks. China committed to full opening of its banking sector to foreign competition 
after a five-year transition period, although to this day e.g. the insurance sector and securi-
ties markets are still not completely open to foreign participants. The threat of tougher 
competition meant that banks, especially state-owned banks, had to become more efficient 
in their operations. This called for changes in the governance and ownership structures of 
banks, and more importantly, bank balance sheets had to be strengthened. Simply put, the 
government had to deal with the NPL issue decisively.  Four state-owned asset manage-
ment companies were established to take remove the accumulated stock of NPLs from the 
balance sheets of four state-owned banks, and the state provided capital injections to the 
banks. The process started at the end of 2003 with the establishment of a special entity, 
Central Huijin Investment Company,
4 capitalized with funds drawn from the foreign cur-
rency reserves and managed by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE). 
The funds were used to recapitalize the state-owned banks, thus allowing the banks to rec-
ognize their NPLs and write down pre-existing capital (Okazaki, 2007). First in line were 
the BoC and CCB, which received fresh capital infusions amounting to $45 billion in De-
cember 2003. In April 2005, ICBC was infused with $15 billion in new capital. Last in line 
was  struggling  ABC,  which  was  not  recapitalized  and  reorganized  until  January  2009 
(Okazaki et al., 2011). 
 
 
3.2  State remains the most important owner of banks 
 
As in other big emerging markets such as India and Russia, the Chinese banking sector is 
still majority state-owned. The difference is in the extent of state ownership. More than 
90% of total  banking sector assets  are state-owned in  China (Economist,  2010), while 
Vernikov (2009) puts the corresponding figure for Russia at 56%. In general, reforms in 
the Chinese banking sector have lagged relative to other sectors of the economy. 
The Chinese banking sector consists of various types of banks and non-bank fi-
nancial institutions in institutional formats that have evolved in the course of reforms. Ta-
ble A.3 lists the most important banks: the top-tier Chinese state-owned commercial banks 
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(i.e. the largest banks) and the main joint-stock commercial banks forming the second tier 
of the Chinese banking system. 
The large state-owned commercial banks provide nationwide wholesale and retail 
banking services. These include four specialized banks established in 1984 and the Bank of 
Communications. All are very large financial institutions even by global standards. At the 
end of 2010, ICBC was the world’s largest bank by market capitalization and the other 
three large Chinese state-owned banks all ranked in the global top ten (see Table A.1). 
The large commercial banks together accounted for 49% of Chinese banking sec-
tor assets at the end of 2010 (see Table A.4). Despite their growth, their share declined 
over the past decade; in 2003, large commercial banks still accounted for 58% of the sec-
tor. With the ABC IPO in 2010 (the largest IPO in history, valued at $22.1 billion), all 
large commercial banks were listed on both the Shanghai and Hong Kong exchanges – a 
stated objective of the reforms introduced in 2002. The move was also supposed to con-
tribute  to  improvements  in  corporate  governance  and  efficiency.  Indeed,  Berger  et  al. 
(2009) show that Big Four banks were the least efficient before the reforms and minority 
foreign ownership was associated with increased efficiency.  
Listing has also influenced other Chinese banks. A study of Liu (2011) on the im-
pact of public listing on performance of Chinese banks finds that profitability increased 
and NPLs declined during the two-year period preceding IPO. Moreover, public listing in 
the developed Hong Kong market seems to have even more positive and persistent effects 
than listing in mainland China. 
Despite listing and the presence of foreign investors, all the large commercial 
banks are still majority state-owned. The share of state and state-owned entities at the end 
of 2010 was 83.1% in ABC, 70.7 % in ICBC, 67.8 % in BOC, and 60.1 % in CCB. The 
corresponding number for the Bank of Communications was 32.4 % (for more details, see 
Table A.2).
5 
Joint-stock commercial banks constitute the second largest subgroup of banks in 
China.  Unlike  large  commercial  banks,  joint-stock  commercial  banks  are  not  majority 
owned by the central government. Nevertheless, some government influence is present. 
Owners include private and foreign entities, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and various 
                                                 
5 In October 2011, the state investment vehicle Central Huijin Investment, which owns majority stakes in the 
four largest banks, purchased shares of these banks to prop up their share prices. Even though the amounts 
purchased were insignificant, the government sent a clear signal it was ready to intervene when necessary. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 32/ 2011 
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government agencies. Unlike small banks that usually serve a certain region, joint-stock 
commercial banks operate nationwide. There are currently twelve joint-stock commercial 
banks, of which eight are exchange listed. The rest are still relatively young as they were 
only established in the first half of the 2000s. The share of joint-stock commercial banks in 
the whole Chinese banking market has increased in recent years, largely at the expense of 
the largest state-owned banks. Their share of the consolidated balance sheet of Chinese 
banks reached 15.6% in 2010. 
City commercial banks are smaller than joint-stock commercial banks. They typi-
cally operate in their local banking markets and focus on serving small and medium-sized 
businesses.
6 These banks, the successors to urban credit unions, were created in the late 
1990s as part of a government effort to improve the efficiency of credit cooperatives. By 
2009, only eleven urban credit cooperatives remained as city commercial banks occupied 
the market. By the end of 2010, there were 147 city commercial banks. The share of city 
commercial banks in the total banking sector assets continues to grow, accounting for 8.2% 
of the sector in 2010. 
Rural financial institutions have traditionally included rural commercial banks, ru-
ral cooperative banks, and rural credit cooperatives (RCCs). New types of rural financial 
institutions have also emerged recently. These include village or township banks, lending 
companies, and rural mutual cooperatives. Rural financial institutions account for about 
10% of banking sector assets, a proportion that has not changed significantly in recent 
years. Within the traditional rural financial institutions, however, reforms have diminished 
the role of rural  credit cooperatives, putting the growth  emphasis on rural commercial 
banks.
7 Rural credit cooperatives were established in the 1950s separate from the mono-
bank. Starting in the 1960s, there were several unsuccessful attempts at reforming RCCs. It 
remains unclear if they are supposed to function as true cooperatives or commercial banks 
and exactly what their responsibilities are to various levels of government (OECD, 2005). 
Given their vague mandate, RCCs have often encountered serious financial problems. Prior 
to 2003, when significant reforms were implemented, there were about 40,000 RCCs. By 
2010, that number had dwindled to 2,646. Nevertheless, they remain the most influential 
rural financial institution, accounting for almost 7% of the banking sector assets. 
                                                 
6 Before 2006, they were only allowed to operate in their headquarter cities (Chong et al., 2010). 
7 CBRC data show there were 22 rural commercial banks at the end of 2008 and 85 at the end of 2010. Their 
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Despite their rapid growth in recent years, new-type rural financial institutions 
still only account for a tiny share of total banking sector assets.
8 These entities were estab-
lished after the CBRC relaxed its market-entry policy in December 2006 with a view to 
improving the quality of rural financial institutions and enhancing competition (OECD, 
2010). Lower capital and fewer shareholders were required for their foundation (Okazaki 
et al., 2011). At the end of 2010, there were 395 new-type rural financial institutions, up 
from just 172 a year earlier. In 2010, these institutions provided RMB 60.09 billion in 
loans, more than three times what they issued in 2009. The majority of these loans went to 
rural and agricultural use and SMEs. Almost 90% of new-type rural financial institutions 
are village or township banks (VTBs). While the operation of VTBs is similar to that of 
commercial  banks,  they  face  fewer  restrictions  in  setting  their  lending  rates  (KPMG, 
2010). 
The development of rural financial institutions includes focus on improving cor-
porate governance and optimizing work flows. The first small- and medium-sized rural fi-
nancial institution (Chongging Rural  Commercial Bank) was  listed on the Hong Kong 
stock exchange in December 2010. In general, the rural banking sector is expected to de-
velop relatively rapidly in the coming years as rural areas have become a policy priority for 
the central government. 
Another institution that plays significant role in serving rural customers is the 
Postal Savings Bank of China. Established in 2007 out of the State Post Bureau, it is today 
the fifth largest bank in terms of customer deposits. About 70% of its 37,000 branches are 
located in county seats or rural areas. 
China differs markedly from other former socialist countries in that foreign banks 
only hold about 2% of banking sector assets in China. As noted, the CEEs moved quickly 
to encourage significant foreign presences in their banking systems through the privatiza-
tion of state-owned banks and greenfield investment (Bonin et al., 2005). Yet at the end of 
2010, there were only 40 locally incorporated foreign banks and 90 foreign bank branches 
in China. Foreign banks operated in 45 cities in 27 provinces in 2010, up from just 20 cit-
ies in 2003.  
Initially, foreign banks were only allowed to offer foreign currency services. In 
2004, their scope was expanded to local currency services for Chinese enterprises in spe-
                                                 
8 The CBRC started to report them as a separate category with the Postal Savings Bank in 2010. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 32/ 2011 
 
 
  17 
cific areas. In December 2006, in connection to WTO agreement, foreign banks were fi-
nally allowed to enter the retail market. There are still restrictions on foreign investors: the 
maximum foreign share for an individual investor in commercial banks is 20% and total 
foreign investment is 25%. There are also relatively high capital requirements for bank 
branches in comparison to domestic banks to encourage foreign banks to incorporate lo-
cally (Herd et al., 2010). KPMG (2010) notes that locally incorporated foreign banks face a 
deadline in 2011 to reduce their loan-to-deposit ratios to 75 %. It should also be noted that 
many of the banks where the state holds a majority stake also have foreign owners. From 
the Chinese side, foreign banks’ strategic ownership has been hoped to provide improve-
ments in corporate governance and technical efficiency. Foreign shareholders, in turn, are 
seeking easier access to the Chinese banking market. The many restrictions placed upon 
foreign banks described above provide a strong incentive to seek alternative avenues to en-
ter this market, which still has high growth potential. 
Beyond traditional banks, China also has policy banks. These were established 
during the second stage of reforms in 1994 with the objective of separating policy lending 
from commercial lending. The Export-Import Bank of China and the Agricultural Devel-
opment Bank of China are still policy banks, despite the fact that their roles have become 
more business oriented. The largest policy bank, China Development Bank, has been re-
structured into a commercial joint-stock banking institution. It can now only accept depos-
its from corporate clients. This process of transformation continued in 2010 with issues 
including  securing  funding  sources  and  determining  credit  ratings  for  bond  issuance 
(CBRC Annual Report, 2010). Despite their specific functions, these banks play a signifi-
cant role in the banking system since they account for 8% of total banking sector assets 
(2010). 
There are several types of non-bank financial organizations in China. In 2010, 
their share in total assets of banking institutions reached 2.2%. These organizations include 
trust companies, finance companies of enterprise groups, financial leasing companies, auto 
financing companies, as well as the very new consumer finance companies. At the end of 
2010, there were four consumer finance companies registered, one foreign-owned. During 
2010, these companies extended RMB 58.7 million in credit to cover over 7,500 transac-
tions. 
Trust companies have attracted huge attention during 2011 as many banks shifted 
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nies. This development is an outgrowth of government efforts to limit the pace of new 
lending. The Economist (2011) estimates that financial products worth over RMB 2 trillion 
were sold in 2010. As such off-balance-sheet items were earlier not treated as loans, it en-
abled banks to exceed their official quotas for new lending. China’s financial regulators 
recently wearied of this interpretation and ordered banks to move these off-balance-sheet 
loans back onto their books.  
Despite the large variety of financial institutions present in China, about half of 
the market is still controlled by the large state-owned banks. However, their market share 
has  been decreasing  over time. Competition  increased with  reforms  as the large state-
owned banks moved out of their traditional specializations and joint-stock banks were es-
tablished (OECD, 2005). This development is mostly visible in urban areas as reforms 
caused commercial banks to largely withdraw from lending activities in rural areas in the 
late 1990s. Consequently, rural households were left with very limited access to credit. 
Comprehensive reform of the rural credit system was implemented starting from 2003 to 
improve this situation, and various types of institutions were established to serve the het-
erogeneous needs of rural borrowers. To increase the quality of services and competition, 
foreign investors have also been encouraged to participate. Foreign investors in general 
expect the Chinese market to growth further, but it is an open question as to how much for-
eign banks will be able to increase market share as domestic banks become more competi-
tive (OECD, 2010).  
 
 
4  Operations and performance 
 
This section gives an overview of the uses and sources of funds of Chinese banks and bank 
performance. We start by analyzing the consolidated balance sheets of banks. 
  
 
4.1  Sources and uses of funds 
 
By and large, Chinese banks are involved in traditional banking services. This is reflected 
in the structure of their balance sheets. On the funding side, deposits from enterprises and 
households are the single most important liability class. At the end of 2009, 68.3% of 
commercial bank liabilities were deposits from non-financial institutions and households; 
total liabilities to non-financial institutions and households were 70.0% (People’s Bank of BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 32/ 2011 
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China, 2010). At the end of 2004, deposits still constituted 72.6% of total liabilities, but in 
recent years bank funding has begun to shift away from deposits. As the importance of de-
posits from the public has decreased, the role of other financial institutions has increased. It 
appears that interbank markets have become more important as a source of funds, espe-
cially for smaller banks and other financial institutions that benefit from funds provided by 
larger banks. At the end of 2009, 5.6% of bank liabilities were to other financial institu-
tions. At the end of 2004, the corresponding share was only 2.0%. 
There are many reasons for reliance on deposits in Chinese bank funding. The 
Chinese interbank market still does not function as well as in advanced market economies, 
but more importantly, the Chinese savings rate at the aggregate level remains very high 
and capital controls effectively bar most Chinese households and enterprises from invest-
ing abroad. Although outside the scope of this paper, one motivation for high household 
savings is to build up a buffer to cope with e.g. health emergencies and education costs. 
Moreover, China’s pension system is still quite primitive, so many need to save for their 
old age. Within China, banks offer a low-risk investment vehicle. Ma and Yi (2010) report 
that the high Chinese savings rate is a consequence of the relatively high savings in all sec-
tors of the economy: households (23.4% of GDP in 2008), enterprises (18.8%), and the 
public sector (11%). This is quite atypical: in most countries, a high savings rate in one 
sector implies lower savings rates elsewhere in the economy. Indeed, gross national sav-
ings have exceeded 50% of GDP for several years now. In the UK and US, in contrast, the 
gross national savings rates have been below 20% for at least two decades.  
Bank lending grew between 2006 and 2010 at the average rate of 20% a year, 
thanks in part to the government stimulus program in the face of the global economic re-
cession. Loans to non-financial companies accounted for around 70% of new loans. State-
owned commercial banks (SOCBs), traditionally the biggest loan providers, accounted for 
43% of all new loans issued in 2009 (their share was 51% in 2001). SOCBs accounted for 
about half of the total banking sector loan stock at the end of 2010. This proportion corre-
sponds to their share in total sector assets. 
Even though the Chinese banking sector is huge for a middle-income nation, bank 
lending is heavily skewed to state-owned companies. Allen et al. (2008) note that the size 
of China’s banking system, in terms of total bank credit to non-state sectors, was 31% of 
GDP in 2005. This figure is not too different from the average of other major emerging 
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ing loans to state sectors, the ratio of China’s bank credit to GDP rises to 110% − a level 
higher than even in countries with German-origin legal systems (weighted average 106%). 
The difference between total bank credit and private credit suggests that most of the bank 
credit is issued to companies that are ultimately owned by the state. Also Okazaki et al. 
(2011) report that bank lending in the recent years has mostly gone to large SOEs.  In 
2009, about 50% of SOCB loans were extended to large SOEs. Private enterprises received 
some 14% of total lending provided by the banking sector.  
 
 
4.2  Bank performance 
 
The reforms implemented since 2002 significantly helped strengthen bank balance sheets, 
and thus profitability. Podpiera (2006) assesses that in the four state-owned banks the share 
of NPLs in total loans was approximately 20% in 2003. However, there was great variation 
in the balance-sheet quality of the four large state-owned banks. The share of NPLs was 
highest at ABC (30.8%) and lowest at CCB (9.1%). This wide difference in balance-sheet 
quality largely explains why restructuring of the big banks proceeded at different speeds. 
As Table A.4 in the Appendix confirms, the ratio of NPLs in total loans for major com-
mercial banks decreased from over 23% in 2002 to 1.2% at the end of 2010. The highest 
proportion of NPLs is found in rural commercial banks (2%) and the lowest in foreign 
banks (0.5%). Following the credit boom in 2009 and 2010, deterioration of asset quality 
appears inevitable. 
The  reforms  included  capital  injections  and  enabled  banks  to  use  financing 
sources from the markets, so they became better capitalized. The average capital adequacy 
ratio (CAR) reached 12.2% at the end of 2010, a clear increase in comparison to previous 
years. Indeed, by the end of 2009, every commercial bank fulfilled the regulatory mini-
mum CAR of 8%. This is a significant improvement from 2003, when only eight banks, 
accounting for 0.6% of total banking sector assets, met this requirement. In May 2011, the 
CBRC announced an increase in the CAR minimum to 11.5% for the banks of “systemic 
importance” and 10.5% for other banks. These changes should be implemented gradually 
from the beginning of 2012. 
Chinese banking is profitable and total profits of the sector have grown rapidly in 
recent years thanks to the booming economy. Banks benefit from the large spread between BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 32/ 2011 
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loan and deposit rates still determined by the central bank. Prior to 2004, lending rates of 
commercial banks were allowed to deviate from the benchmark rate set by the central bank 
by no more than 10%. After 2004, the bands  were widened and currently commercial 
banks have a bit more freedom in setting rates as commercial bank lending rates are only 
subject to a floor and deposits rates to a ceiling (OECD, 2010). The bank loan interest rate 
margins measured by the spread between the weighted average interest rate on bank loans 
and the benchmark interest rate have been decreasing over time. In the first half of 2009, it 
was about 60 basis points (Herd et al., 2010). Despite this development, the major source 
of bank income remains net interest income, accounting for about two-thirds of bank in-
come in 2010. Further important sources are investment returns and fee-based income. 
Okazaki et al. (2011) estimate that net interest income accounted for 82% of the operating 
profit in the major listed commercial banks and another important source was net fee-based 
income (13%).  The authors attribute this to the increase of loans. 
Total after-tax profit reached RMB 899.1 billion in 2010, a one-third increase 
from 2009. The increased profit contributed to higher profitability ratios. Return on equity 
(ROE) went up by more than 1% to 17.5%; return on assets (ROA) was 1%. Large com-
mercial banks accounted for about 57% of total banking sector profits, well above their 
share of total banking sector assets (49%). Their share in banking sector profits has not 
changed significantly in recent years, however. Rural credit cooperatives accounted for 
2.6% of banking sector profits, while their share of sector assets was almost 7%.  
 
 
5  Equity and bond markets as 
  alternative sources of financing  
 
In addition to traditional bank loans, non-financial companies in China have started to 
benefit from other sources of external financing. This has been the case especially in the 
recent years. The significance of capital markets was explicitly recognized in the document 
entitled “Opinions of the State Council on Promoting Reform, Opening and Steady Growth 
of Capital Markets” issued by the State Council in 2004. This document also served as a 
guideline for later reforms. In general, the development of the Chinese securities markets 
has followed a top-down pattern that has been controlled and designed to serve the needs 
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The most significant alternative source of external financing is bond issuance. Its 
share of external funding of the non-financial sector increased from 1% in 2004 to over 
10% in 2010 (see Table A.7).  Bond issues rose from RMB 2.7 trillion in 2004 to RMB 9.5 
trillion in 2010, and have created a substantial primary bond market. Bond trading is a 
somewhat dull business as most bonds are simply held by banks, and even with the in-
crease in issuance, the ratio of private bond market capitalization to GDP in China only 
reached 18% in 2009. In developed countries with relatively bank-centered financial sec-
tors such as Japan and Germany, this ratio was twice as high. In the US, it reached 135% 
of GDP.
9 Public bond market capitalization, on the other hand, stood at 35% in China, 
which is comparable to Germany and US, but significantly lower than in Japan. Part of this 
reflects different levels of public debt.  
Even though the total size of Chinese bond market is comparable to other emerg-
ing markets, it is still dominated by government bonds (Herd et al., 2010). At the end of 
June 2011, the government accounted for almost 77% of the local currency bond market. 
Moreover, the corporate bond market is dominated by state-owned companies. Of the cur-
rent top 50 corporate issuers, which in total account for 65% of all outstanding corporate 
bonds, 42 are state-owned (Asian Development Bank, 2011). 
Figure 4 provides more detailed picture concerning bond issuance by category of 
issuers. The central government, central bank and policy banks are the most significant is-
suers of new bonds. Enterprise bond issues and commercial papers account for about 11% 
and medium-term notes (MTN) some 5% of bond issues. The corporate segment remains 
least developed part of the bond market, due in part to strict regulation. A 100% guarantee 
by a state bank is typically required to issue a corporate bond. In the case of commercial 
paper and MTNs, on an acceptable credit rating is needed (Pessarossi and Weill, 2011). 
 
                                                 
9 All the figures come from Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009) Financial Structure Dataset updated in Novem-
ber 2010. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 32/ 2011 
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Figure 4  Bonds issued in 2010 by category (RMB 100 million) 
 
Source: China Central Depository & Clearing Company, Annual Report 2010 and CEIC 
 
Yet another possible source of financing for non-financial companies is equity issuance. Its 
share in financing of companies is 5% on average, a proportion that has not changed sig-
nificantly in recent years. Reforms have also improved legislation governing stock markets 
and brought China closer into line with accepted international practice (Herd et al., 2010).  
China has two major stock exchanges, Shanghai and Shenzhen, as well as three 
commodity futures exchanges and a financial futures exchange. These markets are large in 
size: at the end of 2010, the Chinese stock market accounted for 7.2% of the world market 
capitalization, making it the third biggest stock market after the US (29.7%) and Japan 
(7.7%).
10 Even so, China’s stock market is small in the economic sense as they do not suf-
ficiently serve companies in raising funds and play no significant role yet in the Chinese 
financial system (Allen and Shen, 2011).  
A flood of IPOs has boosted the number of listed companies. At the end of 2010, 
there were already 2,063 companies traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges 
(see Table A.8). Here, as well as in the other segments of the Chinese financial sector, the 
state  still  plays  a  significant  role  because  the  majority  of  these  companies  are  state-
owned.
11 This fact has to be taken into account when assessing market capitalization fig-
                                                 
10 Based on Bloomberg data. 
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ures. The growth in stock market capitalization has been impressive; total stock market 
capitalization at the end of 2010 reached RMB 26,542 billion (USD 4,028 billion), or al-
most seven times the corresponding value at the end of 2002. These figures should be 
viewed with some caution as they include shares held by the state or state-controlled enti-
ties. Such shares are not traded, although potentially they could be.
12 Freely tradable shares 
accounted for only a third of total market capitalization in 2002. The proportion of freely 
tradable shares has risen significantly, especially in 2009. At the end of 2010, they ac-
counted for 73% of total stock market capitalization.  
Some other features that characterize Chinese stock markets are similar to other 
emerging markets. Prices of traded stocks are highly volatile, which is reflected in market 
capitalization trends. On-year changes in capitalization during the 2003−2010 period vary 
from -63% to +266%. Moreover, trading is concentrated to the largest companies. The 
three largest listed companies on the Shanghai stock exchange (PetroChina, ICBC and 
ABC) accounted for over 22% of total market capitalization in April 2011. Taking into ac-
count  all  of  these  specific  features,  Allen  and  Shen  (2011)  conclude  that  prices  on 
mainland markets do not provide a good picture of the value of traded companies. 
 
 
6  Concluding remarks 
 
The Chinese financial sector is truly in a class of its own, if for no other reason that the size 
of its banking sector. Yet the Chinese stimulus packages of 2009 and 2010 boosted bank 
lending and further increased the vulnerabilities of the Chinese banking sector. While the 
most likely forecast scenarios suggest strong economic growth will keep the stock of NPLs 
in check, continuous increases in lending inevitably exacerbate risk confronting the bank-
ing sector. Given the need to rein in lending and the recent policy emphasis on cooling the 
economy and bringing down inflation, we expect the era of rapid growth in the Chinese 
banking system to be over.  
Chinese bond and equity markets are comparable in size to those found in more 
mature economies, but participation of foreign investors remains limited. On recent years 
the share of free float in the equity markets has increased clearly, indicating a larger role 
for the markets in setting share prices. While Chinese companies still rely more on bank 
                                                 
12 Current legislation enables trading of these shares. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 32/ 2011 
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loans and self-financing for investment, capital markets will increase their importance. As 
capital controls are relaxed, foreign participation will increase. On the other hand, Chinese 
investors themselves would like to diversify their risk outside China, so the net effect of 
looser capital controls on availability of capital to Chinese companies is unclear. 
An overriding theme of this overview has been the prevalence of state influence in 
the Chinese financial sector. Despite significant reforms, the state and various public or-
ganizations still own controlling shares in the largest commercial banks. Recent experience 
from the lending boom of 2009 and 2010 shows that when the authorities decide that the 
economy needs some extra liquidity, the largest banks − even if they now are partially pri-
vately owned and listed on the stock exchange − comply. It remains to be seen whether this 
is in the interest of all shareholders. The state is also present on the lenders’ side; it is esti-
mated that about half of state-owned commercial bank lending still goes to state-controlled 
companies. In this way, the banking system serves as a tool of maintaining the old eco-
nomic system and its large state-owned companies. This arrangement may prove a drag on 
Chinese growth in the longer run.  
If the Chinese financial system is to develop further, the links between the state, 
banks, and companies need to be made explicit through increased transparency. An orderly 
approach to this change on the part of the authorities would reduce the repercussions of 
capital account liberalization and make the transition easier. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1  Thirty largest banks in the world by market capitalization at the end of 2010 
 
Rank  Bank  Country  Market cap 
(USD billion) 
1  Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC)  China  233.69 
2  China Construction Bank (CCB)  China  225.89 
3  HSBC  UK  184.98 
4  Wells Fargo  USA  164.84 
5  JP Morgan Chase  USA  163.31 
6  Bank of China  China  142.64 
7  Citigroup Inc.  USA  140.3 
8  Agricultural Bank of China (ABC)  China  135.26 
9  Bank of America (BoA)  USA  133.38 
10  Itaú Unibanco  Brazil  94.45 
11  Goldman Sachs  USA  92.62 
12  Banco Santander  Spain  92.32 
13  BNP Paribas  France  80.66 
14  Commonwealth Bank of Australia  Australia  80.12 
15  Mitsubishi UFJ  Japan  76.52 
16  Sberbank  Russia  76.48 
17  Royal Bank of Canada  Canada  74.09 
18  Lloyds Banking  UK  73.66 
19  Royal Bank of Scotland  UK  69.09 
20  Westpac  Australia  69.05 
21  Standard Chartered Bank  UK  65.32 
22  Banko Bradesco  Brazil  64.93 
23  Toronto Dominion Bank (TD Bank)  Canada  64.58 
24  UBS AG  Switzerland  63.55 
25  ANZ Banking Group Australia  Australia  61.6 
26  Scotiabank  Canada  58.93 
27  Bank of Communications (BoCom)  China  53.13 
28  American Express (AmEx)  USA  53.03 
29  Banco do Brasil  Brazil  52.51 
30  National Australia Bank  Australia  52.22 
Source: http://www.banksdaily.com BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 32/ 2011 
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Table A.2  Ownership of large commercial banks at the end of 2010 
 
Bank  Name of shareholder  Nature of 







Total number of 
shares held 
Agricultural 
Bank of China 
(ABC) 
Central Huijin Investment Ltd.  State-owned  A  40.03  83.13  130 000 000 000 
Ministry of Finance of the People’s 
Republic  of China (MOF)  State-owned 
A 
39.21    127 361 764 737 
Hong Kong Securities Clearing Compa-
ny Nominees Ltd. 
Overseas legal 
entity  H 
8.89     28 889 057 076 
SSF  State-owned  A  3.02     9 797 058 826 
Ping An Life Insurance Company of 
China, Ltd.  Other 
A 
0.44     1 441 773 826 
Industrial and 
Commercial 
Bank of China 
(ICBC) 
Central Huijin  
Investment Ltd.  State-owned 
A 
35.4  70.7  123 641 072 864 
Ministry of Finance of the People’s 
Republic  of China (MOF)  State-owned 
A 
35.3     123 316 451 864 
HKSCC Nominees Limited  Foreign legal 
person  H 
24.5     85 383 012 022 
ICBC Credit Suisse Asset Management 
Co., Ltd. 
Other dom. 
Entity  A  0.3     1 053 190 083 
Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of 
China Ltd. 
Other dom. 
Entity  A 
0.3     873 259 091 
Bank of China 
(BOC) 
Central Huijin Investment Ltd.  State-owned  A  67.55  67.8  188 553 352 005 
HKSCC Nominees Limited  Foreign legal 
person  H 
28.15     78 587 816 818 
Li Ka Shing  Foreign natu-
ral person  H 
1.01     2 823 470 087 
The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd.  Foreign legal 
person  H  0.19     520 357 200 
Asian Development Bank  Foreign legal 
person  H 
0.18     506 679 102 
China Construc-
tion Bank (CCB) 
Huijin  State-owned  A and H  57.09  60.09  142 745 374 428 
HKSCC Nominees Limited  Foreign legal 
person  H 
19.79     49 481 779 782 
Bank of America  Foreign legal 
person  H 
10.23     25 580 153 370 
Fullerton Financial  Foreign legal 
person  H 
5.65     14 131 828 922 




Ministry of Finance of the People’s 
Republic  of China (MOF)  State-owned 
A and H 
26.52  32.36  14 921 230 045 
HKSCC Nominees Limited  Foreign-
owned  H 
21.93     12 335 266 807 
The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation Ltd. 
Foreign-
owned  H 
18.63     10 482 252 967 
Capital Airports Holding (Group) Com-
pany  State-owned 
A 
2.01     1 133 264 625 
State Grid Asset Management Company 
Ltd.  State-owned 
A 
0.92     519 161 972 
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Table A.3  China’s banking industry 
 
Commercial bank categories 
State-owned commercial banks  (SOCBs) 
Joint-stock commercial banks  (JSCBs) 
City commercial banks 




Major commercial banks, SOCBs and JSCBs 
 
State-owned commercial banks  
 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) 
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) 
Bank of China (BOC) 
China Construction Bank (CCB)  
Bank of Communications (BoCom) 
 
 
Joint-stock commercial banks  
 
CITIC Industrial Bank 
Everbright Bank of China 
Huaxia Bank 
Guangdong Development Bank 
Shenzhen Development Bank 
China Merchants Bank 
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 
Industrial Bank 
China Minsheng Banking Co.  
Evergrowing Bank 
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